Then the Genoways again the second time made another leap and a fell cry, and stept forward a little, and the Englishmen removed not one foot: thirdly, again they leapt and cried, and went forth till they came within shot; then they shot À ercely with their crossbows. Then the English archers stept forth one pace and let Á y their arrows so wholly [together] and so thick, that it seemed snow. When the Genoways felt the arrows piercing through heads, arms and breasts, many of them cast down their crossbows and did cut their strings and returned discomÀ ted. When the French king saw them Á y away, he said: "Slay these rascals, for they shall let and trouble us without reason." Then ye should have seen the men of arms dash in among them and killed a great number of them: and ever still the Englishmen shot whereas they saw thickest press. 1 With these words, the foremost chronicler of the fourteenth century, Sir John Froissart, helped establish one of the enduring commonplaces of medieval military history-the supposed "matchup" of Crécy (1346) featuring the longbow and the crossbow. In this À rst great land battle of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), the crossbow is said to lose because of its opponent's superior range and rate of À re.
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With these words, the foremost chronicler of the fourteenth century, Sir John Froissart, helped establish one of the enduring commonplaces of medieval military history-the supposed "matchup" of Crécy (1346) featuring the longbow and the crossbow. In this À rst great land battle of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), the crossbow is said to lose because of its opponent's superior range and rate of À re.
The commonplace is restated in leading works of the present day; for example, in War, Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III 1327-1360, Clifford Rogers posits an explanation for the crossbowmen's defeat highly reminiscent of Froissart: [ The crossbowmen] began to À re at the English, but quickly discovered that they were completely outmatched by the English longbowmen, who could À re farther and faster with deadly effect. The situation was made doubly worse (emphasis added) by the fact that their large shields, or pavises, which they normally used to give them cover in the À eld, were still in the rear, in the baggage. 2 Note that in Rogers' description, the lack of pavises is mentioned only as an aggravating factor in a situation already assumed to be overwhelmingly unfavorable to the Genoese, because of the widely-known difference in rate of À re between the self bow and the crossbow.
The "Rate of Fire Commonplace" in Scholarly Literature
Rogers is by no means alone in his assessment. The "rate of À re commonplace" as the explanation for the fourteenth century victory of the longbow over its competitor pervades much of the literature. Matthew Bennett describes Genoese losses at Crécy as a combination of both inferior numbers and inferior rate of À re.
3 Edouard Perroy notes the "very rapid À re" of the "Welsh archers." 4 J. F. Verbruggen stresses the difference in rate of À re when discussing the role of the two weapons in England, 5 as does Philippe Contamine. 6 Jonathan Sumption unreservedly engages in technological determinism in his assessment of the longbow's superiority at the earlier battle of Sluys (1340): . . . the longbow once again proved to be greatly superior to the crossbow used by the French and their Italian auxiliaries. It was more accurate. It had a longer range. Above all it could be À red at a very rapid rate . . . 7 In his La Guerre de Cent Ans, Jean Favier notes that while the crossbow is accurate and can "work wonders" in sieges, it suffers from a three-to-one disadvantage in rate of À re compared to what he characterizes as the less accurate, and less powerful longbow. 8 By contrast, Ferdinand Lot
